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Time-consistent optimal fiscal policy over the business cycle
Zhigang Feng
Department of Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign
This paper examines a dynamic stochastic economy with a benevolent govern-
ment that cannot commit to its future policies. I consider equilibria that are time-
consistent and allow for history-dependent strategies. A new numerical algorithm
is developed to solve for the set of equilibrium payoffs. For a baseline economy
calibrated to the U.S. economy, the capital income tax with the highest social wel-
fare is slightly procyclical, while the labor income tax is countercyclical. Compared
with the data, this equilibrium provides a better account of the cyclical properties
of U.S. tax policy than other solutions that abstract from history dependence. The
welfare cost of no commitment is about 022% of aggregate consumption as com-
pared to the Ramsey allocation with full commitment.
Keywords. Optimal fiscal policy, business cycle, recursive game theory, time con-
sistency.
JEL classification. E61, E62, H21, H62, H63.
1. Introduction
There has been a burgeoning literature on time-consistent optimal fiscal policies since
Kydland and Prescott (1977) pointed out the time-inconsistency problem of optimal
policies in the absence of government commitment. Most existing analysis focuses on
characterizing Markov perfect equilibria (MPE) government policies. The current paper
contributes to the literature by providing the first quantitative assessment of business-
cycle properties of time-consistent and history-dependent fiscal policies. I consider a
stochastic growth model with a balanced budget constraint for the government. Instead
of characterizing MPE, I allow for history-dependent government policies and intro-
duce a reputation mechanism (essentially, punishment strategies) in the spirit of Chari
and Kehoe (1990).1 The paper also develops a new numerical method to characterize
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the whole set of sequential sustainable equilibria (SSE). All SSE have been ranked by
their corresponding social welfare, with the best SSE (BSSE) generating the highest so-
cial welfare and the worst (WSSE) providing the lowest one among all SSE. Numerical
simulations highlight that BSSE provides a better account of the cyclical behavior of U.S.
tax policy than equilibrium solutions abstracting from history dependence and reputa-
tion.
The economy is populated by a continuum of representative infinitely lived house-
holds that maximize lifetime expected utility by choosing a sequence of consumption,
leisure, and investment, taking prices and tax sequences as given. Firms maximize prof-
its using a neoclassical production technology. There is a benevolent government that
seeks to maximize social welfare. The endogenous consumption of public goods is fi-
nanced by linear taxes on capital and labor income. There is no commitment technol-
ogy in the sense that the government has an option to choose its policies at every date–
event.
I describe the economy as a dynamic game between the government and the rep-
resentative household, with one-sided lack of commitment (from the government), in
which reputation sustains equilibrium policies. I study SSE, in which the government
chooses tax policy strategically and such policy is sequentially rational. That is, the gov-
ernment chooses a tax policy to maximize social welfare at each date–event given that
the household behaves optimally. Likewise, the representative household behaves com-
petitively and forecasts that future policies are sequentially rational for society. The rep-
utation mechanism ensures that if the government deviates from equilibrium policies
and pursues different policies, then typically a higher tax rate on capital income will be
punished with a low continuation value.2 This happens because the deviation changes
the household’s expectations about future policies. The model is set up so that this new
expectation delivers sufficiently low continuation values to discourage deviations. Thus,
the incumbent government will choose to follow the equilibrium policies as long as ei-
ther the continuation value or the current return associated with deviating is sufficiently
low. Indeed, a lower continuation value raises the cost of deviating and the value of co-
operation, while a lower current return reduces the value of deviation. Therefore, SSE
solves a dynamic programming problem of the benevolent government subject to an
incentive-compatibility constraint for the government at any history. This constraint is
endogenous since the continuation value of deviation depends on future decision vari-
ables and policies.3
In this environment, optimal capital income taxes in the presence of commitment
are zero in expectation and countercyclical. Positive capital income taxes are equiva-
lent to ever-increasing taxes on future consumptions that create permanent distortions
to the economy, and that violate Atkinson and Stiglitz’s (1976) result that optimal taxes
should be equal across all final consumption goods. The government uses a counter-
2The government’s incentive to raise the capital income tax rate comes from the inelastic nature of in-
stalled capital.
3If the punishment associated with deviation can be determined up front (i.e. Chari and Kehoe (1990))
or can be explicitly imposed (i.e. Benhabib and Rusticchini (1997) and Marcet and Marimon (2011)), the
techniques of optimal control may be used to solve optimal taxation without commitment. However, this
is not necessarily the case for some interesting applications.
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cyclical capital income tax to smooth the consumption of public goods. It does so be-
cause the efficiency cost over the business cycle is low; more specifically, the short-run
supply elasticity of capital is very small (Judd (1993)). In contrast, labor income taxes
bear most of the burden of financing government spending. They become procyclical to
smooth the household’s after-tax labor income.
In SSE, optimal capital income taxes are positive in the steady state. Tax rates on cap-
ital income decrease when the value of the discount factor increases.4 In the absence of
commitment, the inelastic nature of installed capital creates an incentive for the gov-
ernment to deviate from the zero capital income tax. This will increase its current re-
turn, but at a cost of a lower continuation value. A higher value of the discount factor
means that the future return carries larger weight and makes deviation more painful.
Domínguez and Feng (2012) find that less-elastic labor supply reduces the benefit of
raising the current capital income tax rate and hence the incentive to deviate. These
findings imply that the Ramsey allocation may be sustainable when discounting is suf-
ficiently low or the labor supply is sufficiently inelastic.
Optimal capital income taxes in the absence of commitment are slightly procyclical
and labor income taxes are mildly countercyclical. When a negative total factor produc-
tivity (TFP) shock hits the economy, the government may want to raise the tax rate on
capital income to smooth consumption of public goods. This is optimal in Ramsey and
MPE since the short-term efficiency cost of capital income taxation is low, as explained
before.5 When reputation is at play, such a policy will alter the household’s expectations
about future policies and incur a lower continuation value as a punishment to deviation.
Hence, the government faces a trade-off between the gain from tax smoothing and the
loss from a bad reputation. This trade-off explains why a procyclical capital income tax
may be optimal for the government in BSSE, but not in WSSE, in which the government
loses its reputation.
Finally, the cost of no commitment is on the order of 022% of total consumption for
a set of parameter values calibrated to the U.S. economy. The welfare cost is measured
by the percentage of consumption that the representative household is willing to pay
for moving from the Ramsey equilibrium to BSSE. I also find that the average tax rate on
capital income is around 5% in BSSE.
Related literature. First, the paper is related to the work of Chari and Kehoe (1990),
Chang (1998), Phelan and Stacchetti (2001), and Reis (2013), all of whom study optimal
policies without commitment by characterizing SSE. The current contribution is differ-
ent in two important aspects. It introduces aggregate shocks, and provides a numeri-
4This is related to Chari and Kehoe (1990), who consider a similar model without capital income tax so
that it is possible to derive the payoff of the worst SSE explicitly. They show that the discount factor is the
key determinant in sustaining the Ramsey outcome. Contrary to theirs, the payoff of the worst SSE in this
research has to be computed as part of the equilibria due to the existence of capital income tax and capital
accumulation.
5Papers that characterize the Ramsey equilibrium include Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1994, 1995),
Stockman (2004), and Zhu (1992). Klein and Ríos-Rull (2003) study the business-cycle properties of taxation
in MPE.
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cal algorithm to approximate the set of equilibrium values.6 Some other papers study
the same class of economies but focus on MPE (e.g., Klein and Ríos-Rull (2003), Klein,
Krusell, and Ríos-Rull (2008), Martin (2010), and Ortigueira (2006)). MPE strategies are
simple to characterize, since government policies are not history-dependent by assump-
tion. However, it is not clear how much insight may be lost by looking at these particular
equilibria as MPE can be a special case of SSE (i.e. Martin (2010)).
Second, this paper is related to research on endogenous fiscal policies over the
business cycle (e.g., Azzimonti and Talbert (2011), Bachmann and Bai (2013a, 2013b),
Barseghyan, Battaglini, and Coate (2010), Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1994), Debortoli
and Nunes (2010), Klein and Ríos-Rull (2003), and Stockman (2004)). I focus on equilib-
ria that are supported by reputation and satisfy time consistency.
Third, this research is also related to Benhabib and Rusticchini (1997) and Marcet
and Marimon (2011). These papers explicitly impose additional constraints on the stan-
dard optimal taxation problem, such as not to allow deviations from the prescribed se-
quence of taxes. Therefore, one can use the techniques of optimal control to solve for
optimal taxation without commitment. Instead of assuming an exogenous penalty, this
paper develops a numerical algorithm that recursively determines the equilibrium con-
tinuation value of government deviation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the economic environment.
Section 3 discusses several equilibrium concepts. Section 4 sketches a method to recur-
sively characterize the set of SSE. Section 5 provides a numerical algorithm for the com-
putation and simulation of the economy. The economy is calibrated to match certain
features of the U.S. economy in Section 6. Section 7 presents steady-state and business-
cycle properties, and Section 8 concludes. Some proofs and further computational de-
tails are gathered in the Appendix. Replication files are available in a supplementary file
on the journal website, http://qeconomics.org/supp/370/code_and_data.zip.
2. Economic environment
The economy is populated by a measure 1 of identical, infinitely lived households and
a continuum of competitive firms. The primitive characteristics of the economy follow
a stationary Markov chain with support S. Time and uncertainty are represented by a
countably infinite tree Σ. For an initial shock s0, each node of the tree, ς ∈ Σ, is a finite
history of shocks ς = st = (s0 s1     st). Let π(st) be the probability of history st and let
π(st+1|st) be the conditional probability of moving from history st to st+1.
6In an incomplete working paper, Fernandez-Villaverde and Tsyvinski (2002) consider an environment
similar to that in the current paper. My work complements Fernandez-Villaverde and Tsyvinski (2002) by
providing a quantitative analysis of the business-cycle properties of time-consistent optimal taxation. It
also complements Fernandez-Villaverde and Tsyvinski (2002) by showing that the sequential and recursive
problems are equivalent when there is an aggregate shock to the economy. This is a key result to extend the
analysis of Phelan and Stacchetti (2001) into a stochastic setting.
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2.1 Firms
In each time period t = 012    , firms produce final goods y(st), using capital k(st) and
labor l(st), by a neoclassical production function in which TFP depends on the current
shock:
y
(
st
)=A(st)F
(
k
(
st
)
 l
(
st
))
 (1)
Every competitive firm maximizes one-period profit by setting rental rates for inputs
equal to their marginal products:
r
(
st
)=A(st)Fk
(
k
(
st
)
 l
(
st
))
 (2)
w
(
st
)=A(st)Fl
(
k
(
st
)
 l
(
st
))
 (3)
The production of the final good can be used for private consumption c(st), public
consumption g(st), and investment i(st). The law of motion for capital k(st) is given by
k
(
st+1
)= i(st)+ (1− δ)k(st) (4)
where δ is the depreciation rate on capital.
2.2 Households
The representative household derives satisfaction from consumption and leisure as
given by a time-separable utility function
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βtπ
(
st
)[
u
(
c
(
st
)
1− l(st))+G(g(st))] (5)
where β ∈ (01) is the discount factor. The instantaneous utility function u :R2+ → R and
the function G :R+ → R are strictly concave and differentiable, and satisfy the Inada
conditions.
Each household takes the government policy {τk(st) τl(st)} as exogenously given
and chooses a sequence of consumptions and labor supplies {c(st) l(st)} to maximize
the objective in equation (5) subject to the budget constraint
c
(
st
)+ k(st+1)= (1− τl
(
st
))
w
(
st
)
l
(
st
)+ [1+ (1− τk
(
st
))(
r
(
st
)− δ)]k(st) (6)
k(s0) > 0 (7)
where τk(st) and τl(st) are the tax rates on capital gains and labor income, respectively.
These tax rates are set by the government. As explained later, the proceeds of these taxes
will determine government spending. Note that (1− τk(st))(r(st)− δ) means that capi-
tal depreciation is tax-deductible. Let k(s0) be the initial endowment of capital of every
household.
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2.3 Government
The government is benevolent and sets up a sequence of tax policies to maximize social
welfare as given by the objective in (5). The government faces a balanced-budget con-
straint and finances a stream of endogenous consumption of public goods using linear
taxation on capital and labor incomes. More specifically, government consumption g(st)
is defined as
g
(
st
)= τl
(
st
)
w
(
st
)
l
(
st
)+ τk
(
st
)[
r
(
st
)− δ]k(st) (8)
Tax rates are restricted to lie in a given interval T = {[ττ]}.7
A policy τ is a stochastic process τ = {(τk(st) τl(st))}∞t=0 for capital and labor income
tax rates. A competitive equilibrium is defined for a given sequence of taxes.
Definition 1. Let Υ {k0 s0 τ} be the economy starting with initial capital k0, the shock
s0, and tax policy τ. A competitive equilibrium for Υ {k0 s0 τ} is a sequence of allocations
{l(st) c(st)k(st+1)} and prices {r(st)w(st)} that satisfy the following statements.
1. Given prices and tax rates, {l(st) c(st)k(st+1)} solves the representative house-
hold’s optimization problem.
2. Input prices equate marginal product.
3. The government satisfies its budget constraint period by period.
4. Good markets clear at all nodes.
3. Equilibrium policies
In this section, I characterize several equilibrium concepts emerging from the optimal
taxation literature. In a later section, I present differences among these equilibria in
terms of welfare implications and allocations. From now on, let x and x′ represent the
current and future value of variable x, while xˆ represents an alternative to x. Let E be the
expectation operator.
3.1 The full-commitment economy
The Ramsey equilibrium assumes that the government has a commitment device that
ties the hands of all future governments (i.e. Chari and Kehoe (1999)). At the initial pe-
riod t = 0, the government sets the tax policy once and for all future periods so as to
maximize the social welfare given by equation (5). The Ramsey equilibrium is defined as
follows.
Definition 2. A Ramsey equilibrium is a tax policy τ, allocations a(τ) = {l(st;τ)
c(st;τ)k(st+1;τ)}, and prices p(τ) = {r(st;τ)w(st;τ)} that satisfy the following state-
ments.
7An upper bound on the tax rate is needed to show the equivalence of the recursive and sequential prob-
lems for the representative household. The lower bound on the tax rate is used to bound the initial value
correspondence.
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1. Policy τ maximizes the representative household’s utility (5) subject to government
budget constraint (8), where allocations and prices are given by a(τ) and p(τ).
2. For every policy τˆ, allocation a(τˆ) solves the household’s problem given τˆ and p(τˆ).
3. For every policy τˆ, the price of each factor is equal to its marginal product: r(τˆ) =
Fk(τˆ) and w(τˆ)= Fl(τˆ).
Without government commitment to future policies, the Ramsey policy, as defined
above, suffers from a time-inconsistency problem (i.e. Kydland and Prescott (1977),
Fischer (1980)). In other words, the Ramsey policy may not be implementable. In what
follows, I assume away commitment and focus on time-consistent policies.
3.2 The economy without commitment
In an economy without commitment, in contrast to the Ramsey equilibrium, the gov-
ernment is now assumed to behave strategically and to set up tax rates period by period.
The timing of the model is as follows. At the beginning of every period t, shock st
is revealed. Next, the government sets tax rates for the current period {τk(st) τl(st)}.
Then the representative household simultaneously chooses the labor input l(st). Given
the aggregate capital chosen in the previous period and the labor input, the market de-
termines prices for capital and labor. Finally, each household independently allocates
after-tax income between consumption and investment for production in the following
period. The government uses the tax revenue to finance the consumption of the public
good. Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the timing.
3.2.1 Sequential sustainable equilibria In the spirit of Chari and Kehoe (1990), I de-
scribe the economy as a dynamic game between the government and the representative
Figure 1. Timing of the game between the government and the household.
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household. Let Γ (k0 s0) denote the game in which all households are endowed with ini-
tial capital k0 and the shock value is s0. Let ζt = (ζ0 ζ1     ζt) be the public history of
the game, where ζt = (st τk(st) τl(st) c(st) l(st)k(st+1)) includes the history of shocks,
government policies, and the representative household’s choices. I focus on symmetric
strategy profiles, as in Phelan and Stacchetti (2001), in which all households choose the
same actions along the equilibrium path. A symmetric strategy profile for Γ (k0 s0) is a
pair of strategies σ = (σCσG), where σC is the strategy for the household and σG is the
strategy for the government. Both are measurable functions. Strategy σG maps publicly
observed history ζt−1 and the current shock st into tax rates for date–event st , namely
(τk(s
t) τl(s
t)) = σG(ζt−1 st). Similarly, strategy σC specifies c(st), l(st), and k(st+1)
as functions of expanded history (ζt−1 st τk(st) τl(st)); that is, (c(st) l(st)k(st+1)) =
σC(ζ
t−1 st τk(st) τl(st)). Let
∑
(k0 s0) = ∑C(k0 s0) ×
∑
G(k0 s0) denote the set of all
symmetric strategy profiles for Γ (k0 s0), where
∑
C(k0 s0) represents the set of strate-
gies for the household, and
∑
G(k0 s0) represents the set of strategies for the govern-
ment.
To facilitate the definition of SSE, let the value of a strategy σG (for the government)
be
ΦG(k0 s0σ) :=
∞∑
t=0
βtE
[
u
(
c
(
stσ
)
1− l(stσ))+G(g(stσ))] (9)
A SSE is defined as follows.
Definition 3. A symmetric strategy profile σ of the game Γ (k0 s0) is an SSE if for any
t ≥ 0 and history ζt−1, the following statements hold.
1. ΦG(k(st) stσ |ζt−1) ≥ ΦG(k(st) st (σc|ζt−1γ)) for any strategy γ ∈
∑
G(k(s
t) st)
for the government.
2. {c(sj) l(sj)k(sj+1) r(sj)w(sj) g(sj)}∞j=t is a competitive equilibrium for
Υ {kt−1 st τst }, where τst := {τk(sj) τl(sj)}∞j=t , (τk(st) τl(st)) ∈ σG(ζt−1 st), and (c(st)
l(st)k(st)) ∈ σC(ζt−1 st τk(st) τl(st)).
In line with Phelan and Stacchetti (2001), let σ |ζt−1 denote the strategy profile in SSE
with history ζt−1. Let (σc|ζt−1γ) represent the strategy profile in which the household
plays a SSE strategy under history ζt−1 while the government plays an alternative strat-
egy. The first condition in the above definition says that the continuation payoff for the
government’s strategy σG is higher than the payoff from any deviation to a different
strategy. The second condition requires that the household always responds to a gov-
ernment strategy with decisions that imply a competitive equilibrium, since this is the
situation that is compatible with feasibility and optimality.
The SSE is characterized by strategy profiles, which are mappings from the entire
history to current choices of the government and the household. The history depen-
dence poses serious challenges in terms of solving equilibria, because one may have to
keep track of the infinite histories (i.e. Phelan and Stacchetti (2001)). In the next section,
I explain how to simplify the problem by summarizing the history of strategies using two
additional endogenous equilibrium values.
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3.2.2 Markov perfect equilibrium An alternative literature avoids history dependence
by limiting the government’s policy choices. This approach assumes that the govern-
ment sets its tax policies solely conditional on some predetermined variables, such as
capital stock and current value of shocks. In line with Klein and Ríos-Rull (2003), an
MPE is defined as follows.
Definition 4. An MPE for the economy consists of tax policy functions τk = φk(K s)
and τl =φl(K s) for the government, a transition function K′ =Q(K s;φkφl), an equi-
librium value function v(kK s;φkφl) for the representative household, and individ-
ual policy functions k′ = qk(kK s;φkφl) and l = ql(kK s;φkφl), such that the fol-
lowing statements hold.
1. For any given φk and φl, the value function and policy functions solve the repre-
sentative household’s problem
v
(
kK s;φkφl)
= max
(ck′l)
{
u(c1− l)+G(g)+βE[v(k′K′ s′;φk(K′ s′)φl(K′ s′))]}
s.t.
c + k′ = (1− τl)wl+
[
1+ (1− τk)(r − δ)
]
k
K′ =Q(Ks;φkφl)
2. Q(K s;φkφl)= qk(kK s;φkφl).
3. The government tax policy functions maximize social welfare on the equilibrium
path:
{
φk(K s)φl(K s)
} ∈ arg max{τkτl}v
(
KK s;φkφl)
The first part of the equilibrium definition says that the household’s policy functions
are optimal choices for any tax policies φk and φl. These policies determine the cur-
rent and future tax rates on capital and labor income as functions of the capital stock
and shock. The second condition reflects the consistency between the household’s and
aggregate behaviors. The last part of the definition specifies the optimal choice of the
current government as functions of today’s state variables.
One advantage of MPE over SSE is that the equilibrium is easy to characterize since
it is not history-dependent. If the equilibrium is unique, one can compute the model by
solving the generalized Euler equation (GEE) or by using methods based on the value
function.8
However, this approach has its limitations. To the best of my knowledge, there is
no formal existence or uniqueness proof for MPE as defined above. Numerical meth-
ods built upon the continuity and uniqueness of equilibrium may encounter additional
8For the deterministic economy, GEE is solved in Klein, Krusell, and Ríos-Rull (2008) using a perturba-
tion method. Martin (2010) and Ortigueira (2006) solve similar models with a projection method. For the
stochastic economy, Azzimonti and Talbert (2011) use a projection method, and Bachmann and Bai (2013b)
develop a method based on value function iteration.
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problems such as lack of convergence and reliance of the computed equilibrium on the
initial guess (i.e. Peralta-Alva and Santos (2010)). Even though researchers can carefully
choose the initial guess and achieve convergence, they still may not know whether the
algorithm has converged to a true equilibrium. In contrast, I develop a method that has
good convergence properties and computes all SSE. One advantage of my approach is
that it allows us to pick some particular equilibria and study corresponding government
behaviors; see Section 7 below.
4. Recursive formulation of equilibria
In an infinitely repeated game, equilibria are defined by strategy profiles that map the
infinite history into the current optimal choices of each player. Abreu, Pearce, and Stac-
chetti (1990) (APS henceforth) show that it is sufficient to characterize the lifetime payoff
of each player in such models instead of infinite dimensional strategy profiles. Further-
more, APS develop a recursive operator whose fixed point yields the set of equilibrium
payoffs.
A naive application of APS to models in this paper will require keeping track of pay-
offs for a continuum of identical households, which is a formidable task. Chang (1998)
and Phelan and Stacchetti (2001) make important progress in characterizing the equilib-
ria for economies similar to mine by incorporating the insight of Kydland and Prescott
(1980) into APS. The basic idea comes from the following observation. Since each house-
hold is anonymous and cannot affect aggregate prices, the household’s problem can be
written in a recursive way by including “marginal value of investment in capital” as an
additional state variable. Henceforth, to characterize the equilibria, it is enough to keep
track of the promised payoffs for the government, together with the promised marginal
value of investment in capital. In what follows, I explain how to recursively formulate
the dynamic problem described in Section 3.2.
4.1 The set of equilibrium values
In equilibrium, every household’s optimal choices must satisfy the first-order conditions
uc
(
st
)−β
∑
st+1
π
(
st+1|st){[1+ (1− τk
(
st+1
))(
r
(
st+1
)− δ)]uc
(
st+1
)}= 0 (10)
ul
(
st
)− (1− τl
(
st
))
w
(
st
)
uc
(
st
)= 0 (11)
where uc and ul denote the marginal utility with respect to consumption and leisure.
Equation (10) is the intertemporal optimality condition, and equation (11) equates the
marginal utility of consumption to the marginal utility of leisure.
I reformulate the household’s problem recursively following the strategy suggested
by Kydland and Prescott (1980) (see Marcet and Marimon (2011), Phelan and Stacchetti
(2001), and Feng, Miao, Peralta-Alva, and Santos (2014) for recent applications). Let
m(st) be the marginal value of investment in capital:
m
(
st
) := uc
(
st
)[
1+ (1− τk
(
st
))(
r
(
st
)− δ)] (12)
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Then, for any st , k(st), {m(st+1)} and some tax policy τ, each household solves
max
c(st )l(st )k(st+1)
u
(
c
(
st
)
 l
(
st
))+β
∑
st+1
π
(
st+1
){
m
(
st+1
)
k
(
st+1
)}
(13)
subject to the budget constraint and law of motion of capital, as described in equations
(4) and (6). The recursive problem defined above is equivalent to the sequential prob-
lem, as defined in Section 2.2, provided that the transversality condition is satisfied:
lim
t→∞
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βtπ
(
st
)
m
(
st+1
)
k
(
st+1
)= 0 (14)
This is shown in the following proposition, which is an extension of the main result in
Section 3 of Phelan and Stacchetti (2001).
Proposition 1. Let preference and production functions take the functional forms
u(c l) = c1−ϑ−11−ϑ + ν(l) and F(k l) = Akαl1−α, where ν : [01) → R is a decreasing, con-
cave function, with liml→1 ν(l)= −∞. Then the recursive and the sequential problems for
the household are equivalent.
See the Appendix for this and other proofs.
Now I can summarize the competitive equilibrium conditions for a given tax policy
τ as follows.
Definition 5. Let ΥS{k s (τk τl) {m′}} be the static (one-period) economy in which
each household has an initial capital stock k and the current shock s, the expected
marginal value of investment is given by the vector {m′}, and the government imposes
tax (τk τl) for the current period. Then {c lk′ rwg} is a competitive equilibrium for
ΥS{k s (τk τl) {m′}} and is denoted by {c lk′ rwg} ∈ CES{k s (τk τl) {m′}} if and
only if the following conditions are satisfied.
1. Households’ choices satisfy the temporal equilibrium conditions uc(s) = βE{m′}
and ul(s)= (1− τl)w(s)uc(s).
2. Input prices equate their marginal products.
3. The government satisfies its budget constraint.
4. Good markets clear at each node.
The following lemma allows us to think of the original economy as a sequence of
static economies with endogenously changing state variables and exogenous stochastic
shocks.
Lemma 1. Given some tax policy τ = {(τkt τlt)}∞t=0, an initial capital stock k0, and shock
s0, suppose that the sequence {c(st) l(st)k(st+1) r(st)w(st) g(st)}∞t=0 is such that for
each t,
{
c
(
st
)
 l
(
st
)
k
(
st+1
)
 r
(
st
)
w
(
st
)
 g
(
st
)} ∈ CES{k(st) st (τkt τlt)
{
m
(
st+1
)}}

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where
m
(
st+1
) := uc
(
st+1
)[
1+ (1− τkt+1)
(
r
(
st+1
)− δ)]
Then {c(st) l(st)k(st+1) r(st)w(st) g(st)}∞t=0 is a competitive equilibrium for
Υ {k0 s0 τ}.
The lemma says that the promised marginal value of investment in capital will sum-
marize the expectations of the household. Therefore, it is sufficient to keep track of the
value of this variable. It follows that equilibria of the dynamic game for the above econ-
omy can be characterized by the set of equilibrium values V(k s). More precisely, the
value correspondence V is defined as a mapping from values of the state (k s) into set
of possible payoffs associated with a strategy profile σ that constitutes an SSE.
Definition 6. The equilibrium value correspondence is defined as
V(k s) := {(mh)|σ is a SSE for Γ (k s)}
where m denotes the marginal value of investment in capital defined by (12) and h rep-
resents the equilibrium continuation payoff of the government ΦG defined by (9).
4.2 Self-generation
In line with Phelan and Stacchetti (2001), I define an operator B whose fixed point is
the set of equilibrium values V. Let W(k s) :R+ × S → R2 denote the set of equilibrium
values and let A represent the space of all such sets. The operator B maps the space A
into itself. To facilitate the definition of B, I explain consistency and admissibility with
respect to W as follows.
Definition 7. A vector ψ = (τk τl c lk′ {(m′h′)}) is consistent with respect to the
set W at (k s) if
(
c lk′Fk(k l)Fl(k l) g
) ∈ CES{k s (τk τl)
{
m′
}}
for (m(k sψ)h(k sψ)) ∈ W(k s) and (m′h′) ∈ W(k′ s′), where the values of m and h
are given by
m(k sψ) := uc(c1− l)
[
1+ (1− τk)(r − δ)
]
 (15)
h(k sψ) := u(c1− l)+G(g)+βE{h′} (16)
In words, consistency guarantees that the vector ψ delivers an allocation that is op-
timal for the household and satisfies feasibility. It also requires that the promised con-
tinuation values (m′h′) belong to the same set of equilibrium values as those of (mh).
Definition 8. The vector ψ is admissible with respect to W if it is consistent with re-
spect to W at (k s) and
h(k sψ)≥ h(k s ψˆ) (17)
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This condition says that government cannot increase its payoff by announcing any
unexpected tax rate τˆ other than τ. Therefore, admissibility guarantees that the govern-
ment has no incentive to deviate.
Definition 9. For a given set of equilibrium values W, operator B is defined as
B(W)(k s)= {(mh)|∃ψ is admissible with respect to W at (k s)}
In the following, I adapt the results of Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) to the
game in this paper. Note that these results are straightforward extensions of those in
Phelan and Stacchetti (2001) for the environment with stochastic TFP shocks. Therefore,
I only list the main results and refer readers to their paper for proofs.
1. If W ⊆ B(W), then B(W)⊆ V.
2. V is compact and the largest set of equilibrium values W such that W = B(W).
3. B(·) is monotone and preserves compactness.
4. If we define Wn+1 = B(Wn) for all n≥ 0 and define the equilibrium value correspon-
dence V⊂ W0, then limn→∞ Wn = V.
Result 1 has been called self-generation. From the definition of the set of equilibrium
values for SSE, it is straightforward to see that V ⊆ B(V). Together with result 1, it is fairly
easy to reach the second result. Results 3 and 4 will be used in the next section to ap-
proximate the set of equilibrium values.
5. Computation and simulation
In this section, I first detail the numerical algorithm that is used to compute the equilib-
rium value correspondence. I then explain how to build strategies that support a given
pair of payoffs belonging to this correspondence.
5.1 Recursive operator
Computing the mapping B amounts to finding a set B(W), the set of pairs of (mh) that
can be “enforced” today,
B(W)(k s) = {(mh)|∃(τk τl)
(
c lk′ gw r
)
and
(
m′h′
) ∈W(k′ s′)
for all s′ 
 s}
such that
m= uc(c l) ·
[
1+ (1− τk)(r − δ)
]
 (18)
h= u(c l)+G(g)+βE{h′} (19)
(mh) ∈W(k s) (20)
h≥ [u(cˆ lˆ)+G(g)+βE{hˆ′}|(mˆ′ hˆ′)] ∀(mˆ′ hˆ′) ∈W(k′ s′) (21)
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uc(c l)−βE
{
m′
}= 0 (22)
(1− τl)wuc(c l)− ul(c l)= 0 (23)
τk τl ∈ [ττ] (24)
where s′ 
 s denotes all possible shocks that follow s. Constraints (18), (19), and (20)
are called regeneration constraints, while (21) is an incentive constraint. Condition (21)
states that the strategy corresponding to (mh) generates a higher payoff to the govern-
ment than any other possible ones. Equations (22) and (23) are necessary to ensure that
continuation of a sustainable plan after any deviation is consistent with a competitive
equilibrium.
As Chang (1998) points out, computing B(W) given W is complicated because of
constraint (21). Chang (1998) suggests an alternative operator to circumvent this com-
plication in the context of finding time-consistent monetary policy, while Phelan and
Stacchetti (2001) develop a similar operator for a production economy like the one in
the current paper.
The basic idea of this alternative operator is the following. The government needs
to consider only the payoff associated with the “best” deviation, but not to evaluate the
consequences of all possible actions. Also, as in APS, if the government chooses to devi-
ate, this is then followed by the worst available punishment. Thus, I redefine the opera-
tor B :A → A by replacing (21) with the condition
h≥ h˜(k s) (25)
where h˜(k s) is the worst possible payoff for the government when it announces unex-
pected tax rate τˆ. As in Phelan and Stacchetti (2001), I consider only extreme punish-
ments. Therefore, I define h˜(k s) as
h˜(k s)=max
τkτl
{
min
clk′(m′h′)∈W(k′s′)
[
u(c l)+G(g)+βE{h′}]
}
such that
[
c lk′ gw r
] ∈ CES{(k s τk τl
{
m′
})
for all s′ 
 s}
Chang (1998) shows that conditions (21) and (25) are equivalent in the sense that re-
peated application of operator B, with either (21) or (25), yields a decreasing sequence
of sets that converge to the same fixed point V. Phelan and Stacchetti (2001) use con-
dition (25). Note that if the value of h˜(k s) can be determined up front (i.e. Chari and
Kehoe (1990)) or can be explicitly imposed (i.e. Benhabib and Rusticchini (1997) and
Marcet and Marimon (2011)), the techniques of optimal control may be used to com-
pute equilibria. However, for my application, the value of h˜(k s) depends on future de-
cision variables and government policies, which need to be determined as part of the
equilibria.
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5.2 Numerical implementation
Even though I can simplify the computation by substituting condition (25) for condition
(21), computation is not a trivial matter, as I need to operate over correspondences. Nei-
ther Chang (1998) nor Phelan and Stacchetti (2001) is explicit about the numerical im-
plementation of their algorithms. To the best of my knowledge, Domínguez (2010) is the
first paper that applies Phelan and Stacchetti’s method and provides a numerical imple-
mentation by adapting the approximation technique developed by Judd, Yeltekin, and
Conklin (2003) (JYC henceforth).9 JYC’s idea is to construct a convex set containing the
set of equilibrium values and another convex set contained in that set. The JYC method
requires the convexity of the set of equilibrium values. Phelan and Stacchetti (2001) in-
troduce a publicly observed random variable to convexify the equilibrium value corre-
spondence. This random variable has been interpreted as a device to synchronize the
behaviors and beliefs of the government and the household. There is an obvious advan-
tage of the JYC method: It uses a polar coordinate system to represent the position of an
arbitrary point on a manifold. Thus, to approximate a convex set, one only needs to keep
track of the supporting hyperplanes at each angle around the polar. This approximation
scheme can reduce the computational costs substantially. However, randomization and
convexification will arbitrarily enlarge the equilibrium value correspondence.
Here, I follow the approach of Feng, Miao, Peralta-Alva, and Santos (2014) (FMPS
henceforth). These authors develop a numerical method to approximate upper hemi-
continuous equilibrium value correspondences. Their method partitions the state space
into a finite set of simplices. Compatible with this partitioning, they then consider a se-
quence of step correspondences, which take constant set values on each simplex. The
main advantage of the FMPS method is that it does not require convexity of the equilib-
rium set and, thus, it is not necessary to introduce a randomization device as in Phelan
and Stacchetti (2001). However, this method faces some computational challenges. It
turns out that I cannot find sufficient computational resources to compute the model by
directly implementing FMPS’s approximation scheme.10 To facilitate the computation,
I impose two assumptions over the equilibrium value correspondence. These assump-
tions help to reduce the computational cost substantially and to make FMPS’s approxi-
mation algorithm applicable.
Assumption 1. W is convex-valued at given {k sm}.
I emphasize that this assumption is weaker than the one in Phelan and Stacchetti
(2001). The randomization device introduced in their paper guarantees convexity of the
equilibrium value correspondence. A convex correspondence must be convex-valued,
while a convex-valued correspondence does not necessarily have a convex graph. What
this assumption says is that for a given (km), there exists a strategy that supports any
9Fernandez-Villaverde and Tsyvinski (2002) also discuss the same approximation technique.
10The current paper uses a modified approximation method based on FMPS. It has been coded in C++
with message passing interface (MPI) and takes over 20 hours with 100 central processing units (CPUs). The
computational cost of directly implementing the FMPS algorithm would be over 100 times greater than the
one presented here, as it needs to discretize h.
204 Zhigang Feng Quantitative Economics 6 (2015)
h ∈ [hh]. Note that h is the payoff of the government. Given the continuity of the utility
function, there is no reason that h is not continuous inside [hh]. I cannot formally prove
that the economy satisfies this assumption. However, I can verify that all computed sets
of equilibrium values satisfy this assumption.
Assumption 2. There exists, at most, one vector (c lk′) that solves the following equa-
tion system at given (k s) and {τk τlm}:
m= uc(c l)
[
1+ (1− τk)(r − δ)
]
 (26)
ul(c l)+ (1− τl)wuc(c l)= 0 (27)
[
1+ (1− τk)(r − δ)
]
k+ (1− τl)wl− c − k′ = 0 (28)
This assumption may rule out some utility functions, especially nonseparable pref-
erences. The following pair of utility and production functions satisfies this assump-
tion:11
u(c l)= c
1−ϑ1 − 1
1−ϑ1 + γl
(1− l)1−ϑ2
1−ϑ2  (29)
F(k l)=Akαl1−α (30)
It seems to me that no algorithm can get around this problem. This is because the con-
sistency check in operator B requires the value of next period’s capital stock to select the
continuation values. Nevertheless, this assumption becomes irrelevant if there exists an
algorithm that finds all real solutions to the equation system (26)–(28) (i.e. Kubler and
Schmedders (2010)).
Under the above assumptions, I compute the upper and lower boundaries of W(k s).
In line with Phelan and Stacchetti (2001), these boundaries are represented by the func-
tions
h(k sm) := sup
h
{
h|(mh) ∈W(k s)} (31)
h(k sm) := inf
h
{
h|(mh) ∈ W(k s)} (32)
As Phelan and Stacchetti (2001) observe, the lowest value in W(k s) yields the value of
the worst punishment for the government h˜(k s)=minm h(k sm), which corresponds
to the equilibrium in which government decides to deviate, that is, WSSE. Note that the
highest value maxm h(k sm) in W(k s) corresponds to equilibrium in which the gov-
ernment obtains the maximum payoff, that is, BSSE. This paper focuses on the bound-
aries of the equilibrium value correspondence, since one can learn a lot about the equi-
libria from looking at extremes. Understanding strategies in BSSE and WSSE conveys
11For the preference and production function used in this paper, the above equation system will yield the
following equation in terms of l, Akα = B(1− δ)lα + [Akα + B(1− τk)αkα−1]l, where A=m(1− τl)(1− α)
and B= (1−β)(1−αp)(1−αc). When {k smτk τl} are given, the right-hand side is monotone increasing
in l ∈ [01]. Therefore, there exists, at most, one solution l∗ ∈ [01].
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important information about all other strategies. To this end, I define an outer approxi-
mation of W: Wˆ(k s)= {(mh)|h ∈ [h(k sm)h(k sm)]}.
I would like to remark that Assumptions 1 and 2 only simplify the computation, but
not the dynamic problem per se.12 The first assumption is used to reduce the dimen-
sion of the above problem. With this assumption, the algorithm tests only (mh) ∈W(k),
(mh) ∈ W(k), (m′h′) ∈ W(k′), and (m′h′) ∈ W(k′). Accordingly, the number of admis-
sibility checks at each iteration reduces from 4× 1024 to 16× 1016 for the discretization
used by this paper. The second assumption reduces the computation cost in solving for
(26)–(28). Note that neither assumption changes the structure of the model economy.
With these assumptions, I have the following proposition.
Proposition 2. If the set of equilibrium values V(k s) satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2,
then for all (mh) ∈ V(k s),
h(k sm)=max
τkτl
{
u(c l)+G(g)+βEh(k′ s′m′)} (33)
h(k sm)=max
τkτl
{
u(c l)+G(g)+βEh(k′ s′m′)} (34)
h˜(k s)=min
m
h(k sm) (35)
subject to the constraint [c lk′ gw r] ∈ CES{(k s τk τl {m′}) for all s′ 
 s}. Here,
h(k sm) and h(k sm) are sup and inf of the set V(k s) for a given m as defined by
(31) and (32).
Domínguez and Feng (2012) derive a similar proposition. Note that the proposition
here applies to the equilibrium value correspondence V(k s), while the proposition in
that paper holds for any W ⊇ V. These results suggest that one can focus on bound-
aries of the set of equilibrium values if the primary interest is in BSSE or WSSE. This will
12To better understand this point, let us think about how one would compute the model without these
assumptions. For better exposition, I focus on the deterministic case. The algorithm will work as follows.
• For any k, pick any (mh) ∈ W(k); for all possible pairs of (τk τl) ∈ [ττ] × [ττ], find all (c lk′) as
real solutions to the equation system (26)–(28).
• Now, check whether there exists (m′h′) ∈ W(k′) such that the vector (τk τl c lk′ (m′h′)) is admis-
sible with respect to W.
• Then keep (mh) in W(k) if there exists (τk τl) ∈ [ττ] × [ττ] and (m′h′) ∈ W(k′) that satisfy the
conditions of the second step. Otherwise, drop this pair from W(k) and move to another pair (mˆ hˆ) that
belongs to the set W.
Besides the complication of approximating the set W, which has been addressed by following the strategy of
Feng et al. (2014), there are two additional challenges. First, the problem has seven state variables, namely
(kmhτk τl (m
′h′)). Second, one has to solve for all real solutions for the equation system (26)–(28).
In principle, I can design an algorithm to compute the model based on the above procedure. However, it
turns out to be infeasible to find sufficient computing resources due to the curse of dimensionality. For the
application of the current paper, the above algorithm needs to run the admissibility check over 4 × 1024
different combinations of (kmhτk τl (m′h′)) for each iteration. Note that I set 400 grid points for k,
1000 for m and h, and 100 for τk and τl . The aggregate shocks take two values.
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greatly reduce the computational cost. Based on Proposition 2, I define operator F as
follows.
Definition 10. For any convex-valued correspondence Wˆ = {(mh)|h ∈ [h0(k sm)
h
0
(k sm)]}, define operator F as
F(Wˆ)(k s)= {(mh)|h ∈ [h1(k sm)h1(k sm)]}
where
h
1
(k sm)=max
τkτl
u(c l)+G(g)+βEh0(k′ s′m′) (36)
h1(k sm)=max
{
max
τkτl
u(c l)+G(g)+βEh0(k′ s′m′) h˜0(k s)
}
 (37)
h˜0(k s)=max
τkτl
{
min
clk′{m′}
u(c l)+G(g)+βEh0(k′ s′m′)
}
(38)
such that vector (τk τl c lk′ gw r {m′h′}) is admissible with respect to Wˆ at (k s).
Define h(k sm)= −∞ and h(k sm)= +∞ if no such vector exists.
Equation (37) is slightly different from (34). The outer maximum is used to address
the case in which the incentive constraint is always violated at given (k s). This may
happen when the initial value of h0 is sufficiently low. For convenience of presentation,
the numerical implementation of operator F is discussed in the Appendix.
The following result shows that this operator has good convergence properties. Re-
peated application of this operator generates a sequence of sets that converge to the
equilibrium value correspondence V.
Theorem 1. Assume that the equilibrium value correspondence V satisfies Assumptions
1 and 2. Let Wˆ0 be a convex-valued correspondence such that Wˆ0 ⊃ V. Let Wˆn = F(Wˆn−1).
Then limn→∞ Wˆn = V.
5.3 Recovering strategies
In this section, I outline how to find the strategy that corresponds to a given pair of pay-
offs in the equilibrium value correspondence. For better exposition, I abstract from un-
certainty. I also focus on the strategy that yields the highest payoff for the government,
which corresponds to BSSE. This procedure can be generalized to find strategies sup-
porting any point belonging to the correspondence.
Step 1. t = 0, k0 is given. Find the highest possible value of h0 = sup{h|(m0h0) ∈
W∗(k0)} and its corresponding m0. Then search for the government’s tax policy that can
support (m0h0). More specifically, choose (τk0 τl0) such that
u(c0 l0)+G(g0)+βh1 = h0 (39)
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where h1 = h(k1m1) and m1 = uc(c0l0)β , (m1h1) ∈ W∗(k1). Values of (c0 l0k1) come
from the solution for the equation system at given (τk0 τl0m0):
m0 − uc(c0 l0) ·
[
1+ (1− τk0)(r0 − δ)
]= 0 (40)
ul(c0 l0)− (1− τl0)w0 · uc(c0 l0)= 0 (41)
(1− τl0)w0l0 +
[
1+ (1− τk0)(r0 − δ)
]
k0 − (c0 + k1)= 0 (42)
Therefore, the above problem is well defined in terms of (τk0 τl0m0h0).
Step 2. t = 1, k1, m1, h1 are given by the solution in Step 1. Now search for government
policies (τk1 τl1) such that
u(c1 l1)+G(g1)+βh2 = h (43)
as in Step 1.
Step 3. Repeat Step 2 for t = 2    T for T be sufficiently large.
Note that the construction above reveals that any sustainable outcome has essentially
a Markovian structure. More specifically, k(st), τk(st), τl(st) and m(st), h(st) depend on
history ζt−1 through m(st−1), h(st−1) (i.e. Chang (1998)).
6. Calibration
The calibration follows Klein and Ríos-Rull (2003). The utility function is of the constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA) form and the technology is Cobb–Douglas:
u(c l)= (1−β)(1− αp) [c
αc (1− l)1−αc ]1−ϑ
1−ϑ  (44)
F(KL)=A(s)KαL1−α (45)
In the baseline economy, I set ϑ= 1.13 The preference of the government for public con-
sumption is given by
G(g)= (1−β)αp lng (46)
I model the technology shock as a symmetric two-state Markov chain with mean 1.
The parameters for process A are calibrated so as to match the variance and auto-
correlation of TFP of the post-WWII U.S. economy, as reported in Prescott (1986). The
rest of the parameter values are chosen such that certain moments in the stationary dis-
tribution of the Ramsey allocation are consistent with the U.S. data. More precisely, the
value of α is picked to match the labor income share of national product; the value of
β is picked to generate a pre-tax interest rate of around 4%.14 The rate of capital de-
preciation δ is chosen to match a capital-output ratio of around 3, αp is chosen to get a
13This yields a log utility: u(c l)= (1−β)(1− αp)[αc log c + (1− αc) log(1− l)].
14See McGrattan and Prescott (2000) for a justification of this number based on their measure of return
on capital and on the risk-free rate of inflation-protected U.S. Treasury bonds.
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Table 1. Parameter values for the baseline economy.
Parameter Values
β ϑ δ α αp αc
096 1 008 036 013 030
A ∈ {09761024} π11 = π22 = 0946
share of government consumption around 20%, and αc is chosen to get hours worked
to be around 25% of total time. Finally, I set an upper limit and a lower bound on tax
rates that equate to the highest and lowest tax rates observed in a simulated Ramsey
economy to facilitate the comparison with the Ramsey equilibrium policy. This yields
a bound for the tax rate [0009]. Phelan and Stacchetti (2001) interpret this bound as
an institutional constraint. The calibrated parameter values are summarized in Table 1.
Note that πii denotes the probability of remaining in the current state, where i= 12.
7. Quantitative findings
In this section, I first present results for the economy in the steady state starting with a
description of the equilibrium value correspondences, BSSE and WSSE. I then discuss
the sustainability of the Ramsey equilibrium. I also compare steady-state outcomes of
the economy in different equilibria. Finally, I discuss business-cycle properties of opti-
mal taxation. I start by describing the economy with full commitment. This is followed
by a quantitative characterization of optimal fiscal policy when there is no commitment
device available in the economy.
7.1 Steady-state dynamics
7.1.1 BSSE, WSSE, and the relationship withMPE I approximate the equilibrium value
correspondence using the algorithm described in Section 5.2. I discretize the state space
with 400 equally spaced points for k and 1000 points for m. I use linear interpolation for
variable values falling outside of the grid. I ran my C++ MPI code using an IBM server
1350 cluster with 50 Xeon 23 GHz processors. Figure 2 shows the approximated equi-
librium value correspondence for the baseline economy. Given this computed corre-
spondence, I construct strategies that support BSSE and WSSE based on the procedure
explained in Section 5.3. Statistics for these equilibria are listed in Table 2.15
To better understand these results, I examine the behavior of the government in
equilibrium. In the presence of commitment (labeled as Ramsey), the tax rate on capital
income converges to zero, which is reminiscent of results of Chamley (1986) and Judd
(1985). The Ramsey government sets the capital income tax rate to be zero in the deter-
ministic steady state because a positive capital income tax creates permanent distortion
against future consumption.
15I normalize the welfare of the Ramsey equilibrium in steady state as 100.
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Figure 2. The equilibrium value correspondence for the deterministic economy.
Table 2. Best and worst SSE, compared with MPE and Ramsey.
Government k/y c/y g/y c/g l τk τl Welfare
Ramsey 2959 0509 0254 2005 0245 0000 0397 100
BSSE 2896 0513 0255 2009 0247 0058 0387 963
MPE 1150 0688 0220 3125 0285 0612 0000 814
WSSE 1003 0681 0215 3188 0286 0789 0000 768
In the absence of commitment, the government may prefer a positive capital income
tax, even in the long run. This is because the supply of capital is inelastic with respect to
the after-tax rate of return in the short run and the government sets tax rates for the cur-
rent period only. Compared to the zero capital income tax prescribed by the initial gov-
ernment, a positive capital income tax helps reduce the tax rate on labor income without
any impact on the current capital stock and investment. Hence, it removes some of the
distortion of the current labor supply and improves the current return to the govern-
ment. To this end, a prespecified zero capital income tax is not optimal for the current
government or, in other words, it is not time-consistent.
In SSE, there is a reputation mechanism that helps define time-consistent policies.
For any equilibrium policy, the current government may find that a deviation to a higher
capital income tax will be advantageous for reasons explained above. To sustain a partic-
ular equilibrium, a reputation mechanism has been introduced to deter the government
with a lower continuation value. This reputation mechanism is essentially a punishment
strategy, which works as follows. If the government deviates from the equilibrium path,
it will affect the representative household’s expectations about future policies. To give
the government enough incentives to stick to the equilibrium path, the household’s best
response, conditional on this new expectation, generates the lowest possible continua-
tion value. Of course, this response satisfies feasibility and optimality for both the gov-
ernment and the household. In equilibrium, the government faces a trade-off between
a higher current return and a lower continuation value in case of deviation. Note that
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WSSE corresponds to the punishment strategy and BSSE is the best equilibrium that
can be sustained by reputation.
For the baseline calibration, the steady-state capital income tax is around 6% and
the labor income tax is close to 39% for BSSE. A positive capital income tax discour-
ages capital accumulation. Consequently, the steady-state capital stock in BSSE is over
2% lower than in the Ramsey equilibrium. The detrimental effect of a positive capital
income tax is more pronounced in WSSE. With a 79% capital income tax, WSSE has a
steady-state capital stock less than 30% of that in the Ramsey equilibrium.
Government policy in MPE is also time-consistent. In such an equilibrium, time con-
sistency is guaranteed by the assumption that the government sets its policy solely based
on the current capital stock (and the value of the shock in the stochastic setting). In MPE,
the current government considers future tax policies as given functions of future capital
stocks. Hence a higher capital income tax will not create any intertemporal distortion
from the perspective of the current government. Consequently, the government raises
the tax rate on capital income until the labor income tax hits the lower bound.16
Martin (2010) suggests that MPE will coincide with WSSE if no interior solution MPE
exists. Numerical exercises in this paper show that MPE generates allocations some-
where between those of BSSE and WSSE. While SSE does not impose any differentiability
on strategies, most research characterizes differentiable MPE. Not requiring differentia-
bility is less restrictive, which may yield lower payoffs to the government in WSSE than
in MPE. A definitive answer to what we give up by imposing differentiability requires an
algorithm to select MPE from the set of SSE. The construction of such an algorithm relies
on an existence proof of MPE, something that is missing in the literature to the best of
my knowledge.
7.1.2 Is the Ramsey equilibrium sustainable? Equilibrium policies in SSE are sustained
by reputation, in essence WSSE. An interesting question is what it takes to sustain the
Ramsey equilibrium. Needless to say, if the punishment to the government’s deviation
goes to negative infinity, Ramsey is sustainable. This is because such punishment will
dwarf increased current return from any deviation. However, the value of WSSE is en-
dogenously determined as it is an SSE and it typically does not go to minus infinity. In a
model without capital accumulation, the policy game is essentially a repeated one and
WSSE can be explicitly identified. It has been shown that sufficiently low discounting will
sustain the Ramsey allocation (i.e. Chari and Kehoe (1990)). When there is capital accu-
mulation, it is not straightforward to compute WSSE. On the one hand, a higher value of
the discount factor makes the deviation more painful, as the future carries greater weight
in determining the total payoff (current return plus discounted continuation value) to
the government. At the same time, this higher value may raise the payoff of deviation,
as the representative household has a stronger saving incentive in any equilibria. Thus,
one must rely on numerical simulations to determine how the value of the discount fac-
tor changes the properties of BSSE. Numerical simulations show that the steady-state
tax rate on capital income increases as the value of β decreases; see Table 3.
16The results for MPE are borrowed from Martin (2010). Although one cannot rule out the possibility that
there are multiple MPE, only one equilibrium has been found and reported in Martin (2010).
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Table 3. What matters—discount factor?
β τk τl
096 45% 345%
086 322% 298%
070 345% 272%
000 924% 000%
Figure 3. Simulated outcome path after the government loses commitment.
Domínguez and Feng (2012) consider a utility function that allows for variation in
the labor supply elasticity: u(c l)= log c−γ l1+η1+η . They keep the value of β constant while
adjusting the value of the labor supply elasticity η. Their numerical simulations suggest
that the steady-state capital income tax increases with the labor supply elasticity. This is
because part of the incentive for the government to raise the capital income tax comes
from the benefit of reducing the labor supply distortion. If the labor supply is inelastic
under the reduced tax rate, then it becomes less attractive for the government to devi-
ate. I conclude from experiments here and those in Domínguez and Feng (2012) that
the Ramsey policy with zero capital income tax may be sustainable when discounting is
sufficiently low and labor supply is sufficiently inelastic.
7.1.3 The implications of no commitment To further demonstrate why commitment
makes a difference, Figure 3 presents the dynamic adjustment of an economy in which
the government switches from full commitment to no commitment. In this experiment,
the economy starts from the steady state with commitment. The government loses com-
mitment unexpectedly at period zero. A BSSE is then simulated. The figure shows the
outcome path over a period of 40 years.
It is clear that the government chooses to impose a very high tax rate on capital in-
come and to decrease the labor income tax when commitment is lost. This happens
because a capital income tax is not distortionary to the current government. The capital
stock starts to fall and hours worked increase. After the first few periods, the capital in-
come tax becomes lower, and the labor income tax increases over time. These findings
are consistent with Phelan and Stacchetti (2001).
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7.2 Business-cycle properties of optimal taxation
In this section, I present the results for the stochastic economy. I start with a description
of some cyclical properties of U.S. tax policy and then give a quantitative characteriza-
tion of optimal fiscal policy with and without commitment, respectively. I then compare
the outcomes of these two economies.
7.2.1 Data Table 4 presents some key facts about the U.S. tax rates over the business
cycle for the period 1947–1990. Capital and labor income tax rate data are reported in
Klein and Ríos-Rull (2003). Data for TFP and gross domestic product (GDP) come from
the National Income and Product Account (NIPA) of the United States.
7.2.2 Commitment Table 5 presents the key findings of the economy with full commit-
ment.17 The main properties of this economy can be summarized as follows.
• The capital income tax rate is close to zero, on average.
• The labor income tax rate is high, in the sense that the lion’s share of tax revenue
comes from the labor income tax.
• The capital income tax rate is much more volatile than the labor income tax rate.
• The capital income tax rate is countercyclical, while the labor income tax rate is
procyclical.
These results are in line with the findings for the baseline model in Chari, Christiano,
and Kehoe (1994) (the case with technology shock only). The Ramsey government takes
the distortion from capital income taxation into consideration. It eliminates such dis-
tortion by setting the long-run capital income tax rate at zero. In terms of business cycle
properties, the optimal labor income tax is procyclical, while the optimal capital income
tax is countercyclical. A procyclical labor income tax helps to smooth the representative
household’s after-tax wage income. The countercyclical capital income tax provides an
efficient means of absorbing shocks to the government’s budget, which varies with the
Table 4. Properties of the data.
Capital income tax
Mean 051
Standard deviation 004
Autocorrelation 076
Correlation with output 017
Correlation with TFP 018
Labor income tax
Mean 024
Standard deviation 003
Autocorrelation 095
Correlation with output −008
Correlation with TFP −000
17The model with full commitment has been solved using the primal approach, as in Stockman (2001).
The author thanks David Stockman for sharing his codes and clarifying some technical questions.
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Table 5. Business cycle properties of tax policies.
Corr. w/
Government Statistics Mean Std. Dev. Autocorr. GDP TFP
Ramsey Cap. tax 0002 0034 0694 −0665 −0748
Lab. tax 0397 0002 0653 0364 0409
BSSE Cap. tax 0047 0054 0783 0090 0057
Lab. tax 0387 0014 0780 −0043 −0043
WSSE Cap. tax 0867 0025 0860 −0140 −0402
Lab. tax 0039 0017 0854 0253 0529
MPEF Cap. tax 0739 0019 0726 −0211 −0386
Lab. tax 0000 0000 1000 1000 1000
MPEK−R Cap. tax 0650 0091 0690 n/a −0800
Lab. tax 0120 0023 0620 n/a 0540
Data Cap. tax 0510 0040 0760 0170 0180
Lab. tax 0240 0030 0950 −0080 0000
size of the tax base over the business cycle. Judd (1993) argues that the efficiency cost
of adjusting capital income tax is low because the short-run supply elasticity of capital
is very small. Hence, the Ramsey government uses capital income taxation as a shock
absorber.
7.2.3 No commitment For the economy without commitment, I find the strategies that
support the best equilibrium outcome, and include key statistics in Table 5. The main
findings are listed as follows. In BSSE, I find the following elements.
• The capital income tax rate is 47% on average.
• The labor income tax rate is high compared with the capital income tax, at 387%.
• The capital income tax rate is more volatile than the labor income tax rate. Both the
capital income and labor income tax rates are more volatile than in the economy with
commitment.
• The capital income tax rate is slightly procyclical, while the labor income tax rate is
countercyclical.
The average tax rates on capital and labor are not very different from what I found in the
Ramsey equilibrium. Even though capital income is distortion-free in the short term, the
government considers that a positive tax on capital will alter the representative house-
hold’s expectation about future policy. Depending on the current tax rate, the house-
hold’s expectations will lead to a level that yields a sufficiently low payoff for the gov-
ernment. This effect deters the government’s incentive to exploit the inelastic aspect of
capital supply. In BSSE, the government sets the average capital income tax rate at 47%
and achieves the highest social welfare.
I also examine the aggregate behavior of the economy in WSSE, in which the equi-
librium generates the lowest social welfare. It is important to look at this particular equi-
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librium since WSSE works as a credible threat that supports all other SSE. I summarize
the findings as follows.
• The capital income tax rate is 867%, on average.
• The labor income tax rate is around 39%.
• A high capital income tax depletes the capital stock, while a low labor income tax
encourages work effort.
• The capital income tax is countercyclical, while the labor income tax is procyclical.
Here, I highlight an interesting finding with regard to the cyclical behavior of taxation in
the economy with no commitment. The Ramsey government uses a countercyclical cap-
ital income tax to absorb the shock to government spending, while the capital income
tax in BSSE is merely procyclical. As Table 5 shows, the correlation between the capital
income tax and the aggregate TFP shock is 0748 in the Ramsey equilibrium, while the
correlation is only 0057 in BSSE. I also observe quite different cyclical behavior in the
labor income tax between the Ramsey and the SSE. The correlation between the labor
income tax and the TFP shock is 0409 in the Ramsey equilibrium versus −0043 in BSSE.
When compared with the U.S. data reported in Table 4, it suggests that BSSE provides a
better account of the cyclical behavior of fiscal policy.
7.2.4 Expectation and cyclicality of taxation The steady-state analysis shows that the
government faces a reputational trade-off between a higher current return and a lower
continuation value in a deterministic economy. When there is uncertainty in the econ-
omy, the capital income tax as a shock absorber will interact with this reputational effect.
When a negative TFP shock hits the economy, the Ramsey government will follow the
contingent plan specified by the initial government and raise the current capital income
tax rate so that it can smooth the public goods consumption. When there is no com-
mitment, the government can potentially implement the same smoothing plan. How-
ever, the reputational effect may make the countercyclical capital income tax smooth-
ing option inapplicable. A higher capital income tax rate will help to absorb the shock
to government spending, but it will also alter the representative household’s expecta-
tion, as argued above. When the government decides to raise the tax rate on capital in-
come, the household only observes the announced tax rates and compares them with
his/her expectation based on the past. The household cannot differentiate the govern-
ment’s intention between smoothing spending and deviation. If the cost due to a lower
continuation value outweighs the benefit in terms of absorbing the aggregate shocks,
the government may not utilize countercyclical capital income taxation. The numerical
exercises suggest that this is the case in BSSE for the baseline calibration.
Next consider the behavior of WSSE and MPE over the business cycle.18 In WSSE,
the government is indifferent between deviating or not. In such a case, it becomes ad-
vantageous for the government to smooth spending by using a countercyclical capital
18MPE is computed using the method of value function iteration; see Martin (2010) for computational
details.
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income tax. Similarly, the MPE government can do the same thing since there is no rep-
utation at all. In MPE, the government is assumed to make policy choices based on the
current values of some predetermined variables. To this end, both WSSE and MPE have
countercyclical capital income tax and procyclical labor income tax. Only BSSE gener-
ates co-movement between taxation and GDP that is similar to the U.S. economy. This
better fit should be attributed to the history dependence and reputation mechanism
considered by SSE.
Klein and Ríos-Rull (2003) were the first to characterize the business-cycle properties
of optimal taxation in MPE. My model is similar to theirs as I explained in the calibration
section. However, the timing in their paper is different. In Klein and Ríos-Rull (2003), the
government inherits a certain capital income tax rate from the previous government and
sets a vector of state contingent capital income tax rates for the next period. To differ-
entiate the two MPEs, I label the Klein and Ríos-Rull (2003) findings as MPEK−R; see
Table 5. MPEF denotes the numerical results in the current paper. These timing differ-
ences result in different long-term capital income taxes. My finding in Table 5 is a remi-
niscent of Klein and Ríos-Rull (2003) (see their discussion in Section 6.8 on page 1242):
the capital income tax rate is higher when it is less distortionary, as in the case where the
government sets the current capital income tax.
7.3 Welfare cost of no commitment
I also examine the welfare cost of no commitment. To measure the welfare loss/gain of
a particular tax policy, compared with Ramsey, I compute the consumption equivalent
variation (CEV). More specifically, I quantify the welfare effect of a given policy by asking
how much consumption must be increased in each state and at each date so as to equate
expected utilities in the Ramsey allocation while leaving leisure and public expenditure
unchanged. For the set of parameter values I use, the welfare loss of no commitment in
BSSE is merely 022% in consumption equivalent.
The welfare gains of the full commitment come mainly from a zero tax rate on capi-
tal income. The gain from the large initial tax on capital income is nearly zero. In Chari,
Christiano, and Kehoe (1994), the government can eliminate the distortion of the capi-
tal income tax by setting a large initial tax and a zero rate thereafter. This channel only
works through the issuance of government debt. For computational reasons, I assume
that the government cannot issue debt. Consequently, the Ramsey government can uti-
lize only the long-run zero tax rate on capital. Stockman (2001) investigates the effects of
a balanced-budget restriction on the Ramsey allocation. There is a big welfare gain asso-
ciated with switching from the Ramsey with a fixed debt, which is similar to the Ramsey
government in the current study, to the Ramsey with no constraint on debt issuance. But
that does not necessarily mean that there will be a bigger welfare gain when government
debt is introduced. This is because the time-inconsistency problem may disappear, as
the government debt can serve as the central commitment device among governments
(see Domínguez (2007)).
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8. Concluding remarks
This paper makes three contributions. First, it characterizes optimal time-consistent
and history-dependent fiscal policies in an environment without government commit-
ment to future policies. Furthermore, it provides the first quantitative assessment of the
business-cycle properties of such policies for a baseline economy calibrated to the U.S.
economy.
Second, the best sustainable capital income tax rate is shown to be slightly pro-
cyclical and positive on average, while the labor income tax is countercyclical. When
compared with the data, BSSE provides a better account of the cyclical properties of the
U.S. tax policy than Ramsey and MPE. Numerical exercises in this paper show that this
better fit should be attributed to the history dependence and reputation mechanism
considered by SSE.
Third, it makes a methodological contribution by developing a numerical algorithm
to solve for SSE of economies with lack of government commitment. This approach is
also applicable to a large set of environments, such as a monetary economy without
commitment.
Of course, these results hold for a set of parameter values. As in most of the taxa-
tion literature, it seems difficult to state general results. Nevertheless, the specification
of preferences in this paper is compatible with the existence of a balanced growth path
and satisfies some properties related to uniform commodity taxation (see Chari and Ke-
hoe (1999)).
I abstract from several important features of the data. First, for computational rea-
sons, I maintain the assumption that the government cannot issue debt. In an environ-
ment without government default, it has been shown that public debt may serve as a
substitute for commitment (see Lucas and Stokey (1983), Domínguez (2007)). If default
is an option, then the government may be tempted to default on its debts and an equi-
librium with positive debt may not exist (see Prescott (1977), Chari and Kehoe (1993),
Stockman (2004), and Domínguez (2010)). Hence, it remains an open question as to
whether or not a government’s ability to issue debt can affect the properties of optimal
taxation. A good understanding of these points will help us address important policy
issues, such as whether the government should increase the tax rate or reconsider the
debt limit when the economy is on the brink of default. This is particularly relevant in
view of the recent fiscal woes and sovereign debt crisis.
I also abstract from agent heterogeneities. The presence of different types of agents
may raise interesting political economy issues that deserve careful study. For compu-
tational reasons, I opt for a setup with a representative household. However, it should
be noted that the algorithm developed in the current paper is built upon Feng et al.
(2014), whose analysis is developed for a setting with heterogeneous agents. It should
be straightforward to extend the method to an environment with different types of gov-
ernments and households. Finally, the numerical method developed here faces some
computational challenges—even with the help of high-performance, parallel comput-
ing. A better understanding of the construction of the equilibrium payoff set will cer-
tainly improve the efficiency of the algorithm (i.e. Abreu and Sannikov (2014)). I leave
these questions for future research.
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Appendix
A.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. I abstract from all uncertainties to simplify the exposition. If
one plugs the definition of m(st+1) into the first order condition in terms of k(st) of the
recursive problem, then one gets the same expression as equation (10). Next I show that
the transversality condition holds.
First, there exist k > 0 and k > 0 such that for all k0 ∈ [kk] and feasible tax policy τ,
each competitive equilibrium Υ {k0 τ} satisfies kt+1 ∈ [kk] for all t ≥ 0 by applying an
argument similar to Lemma 2 in Phelan and Stacchetti (2001).
Second, I show that there exists m¯ < ∞ such that mt ≤ m¯ for all t ≥ 0. Consider the
situation where the capital stock of the economy hits the lower bound k and the gov-
ernment levies maximum tax rates τ < 1 on capital income and labor income. The In-
ada conditions limc→0 uc(c l) = ∞ and liml→0 ul(0 l) = 0 imply that the household will
be better off by spending a strictly positive amount of time l > 0 in working so that
she/he can obtain some income to finance a positive consumption. The household’s
income will be (1 − τk)(Fk(k l) − δ)k + (1 − τl)Fl(k l)l > 0. The first order condition
(11) implies that the optimal consumption will be [ (1−τl)Fl(kl)νl(l) ]1/σ > 0, which yields a
lower bound for ct . Therefore, mt is bounded by m¯ = [1 + (1 − τk)(Fk(k l) − δ)]c−ϑ =
[1+ (1− τk)(Fk(k l)− δ)] νl(l)(1−τl)Fl(kl) > 0.
Finally, I have limt→∞βtmtkt ≤ limt→∞βtm¯k= 0. 
Proof of Proposition 2. By definition, h(k sm) is the maximum value of h at given
(k sm). Therefore,
h(k sm) = max
τkτn
max
m′h′
u(c l)+G(g)+βE{h(k′ s′m′)}
= max
τkτn
u(c l)+G(g)+ max
τkτn
max
m′h′
βE
{
h
(
k′ s′m′
)}
= max
τkτn
u(c l)+G(g)+βE{h(k′ s′m′)}
where the first equality follows from the definition of h(k sm) and the second equal-
ity follows from the fact that there exists at most one pair of (c lk′) consistent with
{(τk τn)m} at given (k s). The last equality uses the definition of h.
A similar argument applies to h(k sm). A few comments are as follows. First,
h(k sm) = maxτkτl minm′h′ u(c l) + G(g) + βE{h′}. Second, it should be noted that
the value of u(c l) + G(g) + βE{h(k′ s′m′)} at given {τk τl} may be smaller than
h˜(k s), which says that the incentive constraint is not satisfied when the government
has the lowest continuation value. When this happens, the government needs a higher
continuation value so that the incentive constraint is satisfied. However, the corre-
sponding payoff for the present government cannot be higher than h˜(k s). This is be-
cause only the minimization operates when {τk τl} is given. There always exists h′ ∈
[h(k′ s′m′)h(k′ s′m′)] to bind the incentive constraint when the worst continuation
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value violates the incentive constraint. Otherwise, m should not belong to the equilib-
rium value correspondence.
h˜(k s) is the payoff of WSSE, it must be in the lower boundary h(k sm). Because it
is the worst of all, it must be equal to minm h(k sm). 
Proof of Theorem 1. First I show that the sequence of {Wˆn} is decreasing and Wˆn ⊇
Wˆn+1. I claim that the upper boundary of {Wˆn} is decreasing. This is because h1(k sm)
is defined as maxτkτl u(c l)+G(g)+βE{h
0
(k′ s′m′)} such that ψ= (τk τl c lk′ gw
r {m′h′}) is admissible with respect to Wˆ0 at (k s). The admissibility of the vector ψ im-
plies that (mh
1
(k sm)) ∈ Wˆ0(k s). Therefore, h1(k sm)≤max{h|(mh) ∈ Wˆ0(k s)} =
h
0
(k sm). Similarly, I have h1(k sm) ≥ h0(k sm). The same argument holds for
Wˆn(k s).
Since the sequence is decreasing, it has a limit Wˆ∞. Proposition 2 implies that
F(V)= V. By a simple limit argument, one has limn→∞ Wˆ∞ = V. 
A.2 Numerical implementation of operator F
Let K × S × M × H denotes the space of all equilibrium state vectors (k smh). Let us
define a grid Kˆ = {ki1}Nki1=1. I assume that S is finite and S = {si2}
Ns
i2=1. After this discretiza-
tion, instead of a correspondence W :K × S → M × H, I have Wˆ : Kˆ × S → M × H. It is
equivalent to think about this correspondence as Nk ×Ns sets Wˆ(ki1 si2), where ki1 ∈ Kˆ
and si2 ∈ S. Notice that Wˆ approximates W well as Nk becomes sufficiently large.
The algorithm starts with an initial guess W0(k s) = {(mh(k sm))} and a per-
determined tolerance ε > 0.
Step 1-1. For any given (k s) ∈ K × S, pick (mh) ∈ W0(k s). Let us store the pair
(mh) in Ω(k s) if there exist (τk τl) ∈ T and (m′h′) ∈W0(k′ s′) such that
h= u(c l)+G(g)+βE{h′}≥ h˜0(k s) (47)
uc(c l)−βE
{
m′
}= 0 (48)
where (c lk′) are determined as solutions for the equations
m− uc(c l) ·
[
1+ (1− τk)(r − δ)
]= 0 (49)
ul(c l)− (1− τl)w · uc(c l)= 0 (50)
(1− τl)wl+
[
1+ (1− τk)(r − δ)
]
k− (c + k′)= 0 (51)
Note that
h
0
(k sm)= sup
h
{
h|(mh) ∈W0(k s)} (52)
h0(k sm) := inf
h
{
h|(mh) ∈W0(k s)} (53)
h˜0(k s)=min
m
h0(k sm) (54)
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Step 1-2. Given (k s), and Ω(k s), denote Ωm := {m|(mh) ∈Ω(k s)}, and define
h
1
(k sm)=max
τkτl
max
(m′h′)∈W0
u(c l)+G(g)+βE{h0(k′ s′m′)} (55)
h1(k sm)=max
{
max
τkτl
min
(m′h′)∈W0
u(c l)+G(g)+βEh0(k′ s′m′)
(56)
h˜0(k s)
}
for all m ∈Ωm. Otherwise, I set
h
1
(k sm)= +∞ (57)
h1(k sm)= −∞ (58)
Next, let
h˜1(k s)= min
m∈Ωm
h1(k sm) (59)
Step 2. Define W1(k s)= {(mh)|m ∈Ωm(k s)h ∈ [h1(k sm)h1(k sm)]}.
Step 3. Set W∗ = W1 if ‖W1−W0 ‖< ε; otherwise, set W0 =W1 and go back to Step 1.
References
Abreu, D., D. Pearce, and E. Stacchetti (1990), “Toward a theory of discounted repeated
games with imperfect monitoring.” Econometrica, 58, 1041–1063. [198, 201]
Abreu, D. and Y. Sannikov (2014), “An algorithm for two player repeated games with per-
fect monitoring.” Theoretical Economics, 9, 313–338. [216]
Atkinson, A. B. and J. E. Stiglitz (1976), “The design of tax structure: Direct vs. indirect
taxation.” Journal of Public Economics, 6, 55–75. [190]
Azzimonti, M. and M. Talbert (2011), “Partisan cycles and the consumption volatility
puzzle.” Working Paper 11-21, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. [192, 197]
Bachmann, R. and J. H. Bai (2013a), “Politico-economic inequality and the comovement
of government purchases.” Review of Economic Dynamics, 16 (4), 565–580. [192]
Bachmann, R. and J. H. Bai (2013b), “Public consumption over the business cycle.”
Quantitative Economics, 4 (3), 417–451. [192, 197]
Barseghyan, L., M. Battaglini, and S. Coate (2010), “Fiscal policy over the real business
cycle: A positive theory.” Report, Princeton University. [192]
Benhabib, J. and A. Rusticchini (1997), “Optimal taxes without commitment.” Journal of
Economic Theory, 77, 231–259. [190, 192, 202]
Chamley, C. (1986), “Optimal taxation of capital income in general equilibrium with in-
finite lives.” Econometrica, 54, 607–622. [208]
220 Zhigang Feng Quantitative Economics 6 (2015)
Chang, R. (1998), “Credible monetary policy in an infinite horizon model: Recursive ap-
proaches.” Journal of Economic Theory, 81, 431–461. [191, 198, 202, 203, 207]
Chari, V. V., L. J. Christiano, and P. J. Kehoe (1994), “Optimal fiscal policy in a business
cycle model.” Journal of Political Economy, 102, 617–652. [191, 192, 212, 215]
Chari, V. V., L. J. Christiano, and P. J. Kehoe (1995), “Policy analysis in business cycle mod-
els.” InFrontiers of Business Cycle Research, Vol. 12 (T. F. Cooley, ed.), Princeton University
Press, Princeton. [191]
Chari, V. V. and P. J. Kehoe (1990), “Sustainable plans.” Journal of Political Economy, 98,
783–802. [189, 190, 191, 195, 202, 210]
Chari, V. V. and P. J. Kehoe (1993), “Sustainable plans and debt.” Journal of Economic
Theory, 61, 230–261. [216]
Chari, V. V. and P. J. Kehoe (1999), “Optimal fiscal and monetary policy.” Staff Report 251,
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [194, 216]
Debortoli, D. and R. Nunes (2010), “Fiscal policy under loose commitment.” Journal of
Economic Theory, 145, 1005–1032. [192]
Domínguez, B. (2007), “Public debt and optimal taxes without commitment.” Journal of
Economic Theory, 135, 159–170. [215, 216]
Domínguez, B. (2010), “The time-consistency of government debt and institutional re-
strictions on the level of debt.” Manuscript. [203, 216]
Domínguez, B. and Z. Feng (2012), “The effect of time-consistent capital taxation on
capital accumulation and welfare.” Manuscript. [191, 205, 210, 211]
Feng, Z., J. Miao, A. Peralta-Alva, and M. Santos (2014), “Numerical simulation of non-
optimal dynamic equilibrium models.” International Economic Review, 55, 83–110. [198,
203, 205, 216]
Fernandez-Villaverde, J. and A. Tsyvinski (2002), “Optimal fiscal policy in a business cy-
cle model without commitment.” Manuscript. [192, 203]
Fischer, S. (1980), “Dynamic inconsistency, cooperation, and the benevolent dissem-
bling government.” Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control, 2, 93–107. [195]
Judd, K. (1985), “Redistributive taxation in a simple perfect foresight model.” Journal of
Public Economics, 28, 59–83. [208]
Judd, K. (1993), “Optimal taxation in dynamic stochastic economies: Theory and evi-
dence.” Manuscript, Hoover Institution. [191, 213]
Judd, K., S. Yeltekin, and J. Conklin (2003), “Computing supergame equilibria.” Econo-
metrica, 71, 1239–1254. [203]
Klein, P. and J.-V. Ríos-Rull (2003), “Time-consistent optimal fiscal policy.” International
Economic Review, 44, 1217–1245. [191, 192, 197, 207, 212, 215]
Quantitative Economics 6 (2015) Time-consistent optimal fiscal policy 221
Klein, P., P. Krusell, and J.-V. Ríos-Rull (2008), “Time-consistent public policy.” Review of
Economic Studies, 75, 789–808. [192, 197]
Kubler, F. and K. Schmedders (2010), “Tackling multiplicity of equilibria with Gröbner
bases.” Operations Research, 58, 1037–1050. [204]
Kydland, F. E. and E. C. Prescott (1977), “Rules rather than discretion: The inconsistency
of optimal plans.” Journal of Political Economy, 85, 473–491. [189, 195]
Kydland, F. E. and E. C. Prescott (1980), “Dynamic optimal taxation, rational expectations
and optimal control.” Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control, 2, 79–91. [198]
Lucas, R. and N. L. Stokey (1983), “Optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy
without capital.” Journal of Monetary Economics, 12, 55–93. [216]
Marcet, A. and R. Marimon (2011), “Recursive contracts.” Manuscript, Universitat
Pomepeu Fabra. [190, 192, 198, 202]
Martin, F. M. (2010), “Markov-perfect capital and labor taxes.” Journal of Economic Dy-
namics & Control, 34, 503–521. [192, 197, 210, 214]
McGrattan, E. R. and E. C. Prescott (2000), “Is the stock market overvalued?” Quarterly
Review Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Fall, 20–40. [207]
Ortigueira, S. (2006), “Markov-perfect optimal taxation.” Review of Economic Dynamics,
9, 153–178. [192, 197]
Peralta-Alva, A. and M. S. Santos (2010), “Problems in the numerical simulation of mod-
els with heterogeneous agents and economic distortions.” Journal of the European Eco-
nomic Association, 8, 617–625. [198]
Phelan, C. and E. Stacchetti (2001), “Sequential equilibria in a Ramsey tax model.”
Econometrica, 69, 1491–1518. [191, 192, 196, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 208, 211,
217]
Prescott, E. C. (1977), “Should control theory be used for economic stabilization?”
Carnegie–Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 7, 13–38. [216]
Prescott, E. C. (1986), “Theory ahead of business-cycle measurement.” Carnegie–
Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 25, 11–44. [207]
Reis, C. (2013), “Taxation without commitment.” Economic Theory, 52, 565–588. [191]
Stockman, D. (2001), “Balance-budget rules: Welfare loss and optimal policies.” Review
of Economic Dynamics, 4, 438–459. [212, 215]
Stockman, D. (2004), “Default, reputation and balanced-budget rules.” Review of Eco-
nomic Dynamics, 7, 382–405. [191, 192, 216]
Zhu, X. (1992), “Optimal fiscal policy in a stochastic growth model.” Journal of Economic
Theory, 58, 250–289. [191]
Submitted June, 2013. Final version accepted January, 2014.
